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As  long  as  there  are  elections,  there  will  be  proposals  to change  the  tax 
system.  As  the  1996  elections  demonstrate  yet  again,  there  is nothing  so 
certain  to generate  interest  in  a candidate  than  a dramatic  plan  to change  the 
taxes  that  people  pay. 
This  truism  of American  politics  is a useful  reminder  to those  who 
would  offer  the  Perfect  Tax  System:  No  matter  what  you  do,  it will  be 
changed  very  quickly.  While  it is  always  good  to look  for  ways  to improve  the 
tax  code,  it is  the  height  of arrogance  to claim  that  there  is  a way  to change 
the  tax  code  once  and  for  all.  Nothing  is permanent.  Even  a candidate  like 
Bob  Dole,  who  claims  that  he wants  a simpler  tax  system,  cannot  resist 
offering  baubles  like  a $500-per-child  tax  credit,  adding  several  more  pages  of 
rules  and  interpretations  to  the  U.S.  tax  code. 
Moreover,  while  the  Dole  plan  became  the  centerpiece  of political 
discussion  in late  1996,  replacing  the  earlier  fevered  discussions  of Steve 
Forbes’s  flat  tax  plan,  the  next  President  and  Congress  will  deal  with  the 
more  fundamental  question  underlying  Forbes’s  short-lived  popularity: 
Should  the  tax  system  be  changed  completely?  At  some  point,  the  discussion 
will  return  to  that  central  issue. 
Probably  the  most  basic  reason  for  this  is that  taxes  evoke  not  only 
strong  but  contradictory  feelings.  People  feel  a basic  conflict  between  the 
desire  to keep  as  much  money  as possible  and  the  sense  that  they  should contribute  to the  good  of society;  between  the  respect  for  privacy  and  the  need 
to be  sure  that  others  are  paying  their  share;  between  the  dislike  of 
complexity  and  the  desire  to be  responsive  to unique  situations. 
Given  those  and  many  other  conflicting  feelings,  it is  not  surprising  that 
the  current  system  has  been  decried  from  every  point  on  the  political 
spectrum,  being  variously  described  as  “broken,  “unsalvageable,”  and  even  “a 
disgrace.”  Hoping  to  capitalize  on these  emotions,  growing  numbers  of 
politicians  have  taken  up  the  cause  of tax  “reform”-not  just  of the  income 
tax  system,  which  is  certainly  the  focus  of voter  discontent,  but  of the  entire 
federal  tax  system  itself.  In many  cases,  the  plans  being  proffered  are  hardly 
new.1  The  common  element  in  each  case,  however,  is the  fundamental  nature 
of the  changes  being  sought.  The  plans  are,  in  the  truest  sense  of the  word, 
radical. 
The  marketers  of these  radical  plans  have  developed  a group  of ideas 
and  buzz-words  that  have  been  repeated  so often  that  they  have  almost  lost 
their  meaning.  Terms  like  “confiscatory  tax  rates,”  “punishing  success,”  and 
“a penalty  on  the  creation  of wealth”  are  typical  descriptions  of the  problems 
with  the  tax  system  (even  though  such  descriptions  are  not  actually  attacks 
on the  U.S.  tax  system  specifically,  but  are  instead  arguments  against 
progressivity  in  even  the  simplest  tax  code),  in  addition  to attacks  on  specific 
aspects  of the  U.S  system,  which  are  often  referred  to as  “social  engineering,” 
“picking  winners  and  losers,”  or “micro-managing  the  economy.” 
While  each  of the  proposals2  discussed  below  has  its  distinguishing 
1  For  example,  Tobin  [1949],  almost  a half-century  ago,  referred  to  savings- 
exempt  taxes  as having  “a  long  history.” 
2  Some  of the  plans  described  below  have  already  been  submitted  as bills  in 
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simplified  income  taxes,  value-added  taxes  (of which  sales  taxes  are  but  one 
type),  saving-exempt  taxes,  and  labor-income  taxes. 
Each  of the  plans,  no matter  its  basic  type,  is being  promoted  by 
stressing  its  greater  simplicity  relative  to the  current  system.  The  last  three 
are  also  claimed  to increase  the  rate  of national  saving.  Both  of these  goals 
are  intended  to lead  to greater  investment,  higher  levels  of long-term 
economic  growth,  higher  standards  of living,  and  greater  international 
competitiveness. 
Many  of the  plans,  moreover,  have  been  designed  to be  “revenue- 
neutral,”  that  is,  neither  to raise  nor  lower  total  tax  revenues  for  the  U.S. 
Treasury,  while  others  are  designed  to  cut  taxes  as  a supply-side  measure,  in 
the  belief  that  such  cuts  will  act  as  a spur  to productivity  and  innovation. 
This  paper  will  assess  the  basic  tax  proposals  and  analyze  their  likely 
impacts,  arguing  that  most  (if not  all)  of the  possible  benefits  of radical 
change  can  be  achieved  through  extensive  reform  of the  current  structure. 
Most  important,  it  will  be  argued  that  we  should  not  switch  from  a system  of 
taxing  income  to one  taxing  consumption  (or  one  taxing  only  labor  income). 
Our  tax  system  is  certainly  flawed  (as  any  real-world  tax  system  would  be), 
but  our  basic  approach  to taxation  is  sound. 
A  special  note:  One  of the  most  important  issues  in  any  tax  reform 
proposal  is its  degree  of progressivity  or regressivity,  i.e.,  its  impact  on  the 
distribution  of income.  That  issue  is  discussed  extensively  in  a companion 
Congress,  while others are still in the public discussion stages (and thus have  not been 
described  in similar detail by their sponsors). 
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passing  below,  the  bulk  of this  analysis  is designed  to evaluate  the  various 
elements  of pending  tax  proposals  from  the  standpoint  of their  technical  and 
efficiency  aspects.  This  should  not,  however,  be  viewed  as  an  indication  that 
the  author  believes  progressivity  to be  an  unimportant  issue. 
Before  discussing  the  particular  plans,  however,  it will  be  important  to 
dispense  with  three  commonly-heard  arguments  regarding  these  tax  plans: 
first,  the  argument  that  capital  should  be  taxed  less  than  it is now  (or  not  at 
all);  second,  arguments  about  how  to estimate  the  revenue  effects  of a new 
tax  system;  and  third,  arguments  against  “double-taxation.” 
A.  Cutting  Taxes  on  Capital  (Entirely?) 
One  of the  basic  arguments  advanced  by  those  who  would  abandon  the 
current  tax  system  entirely  is  that  we  are  over-taxing  capital  income.  In 
some  cases,  the  argument  is  that  we  should  reduce  taxes  on  capital  income, 
while  others  would  exempt  all income  from  capital  from  being  taxed  at all. 
This  is based  on the  conclusions  from  a simple  “neo-classical”  approach  to 
understanding  the  economy,  i.e.,  the  method  of analysis  which  says  that 
government  intervention  can  only  move  a free-market  economy  away  from  its 
preferred  position. 
There  are  two  ways  to analyze  such  claims:  to attack  the  neo-classical 
approach  itself,  or to  show  that  even  the  neo-classical  approach  can  reach 
different  conclusions  if it  starts  from  more  realistic  conclusions.  The  latter 
approach  is preferred  here,  simply  because  it avoids  unnecessarily 
fundamental  paradigmatic  arguments.  It is  sufhcient  to  show  that  the  logic 
does  not  support  the  conclusions.  This  can  be  done  both  empirically  and 
theoretically. 
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economists  who  have  attempted  to apply  the  neoclassical  model  to  actual 
U.S.  data,  testing  whether  cuts  in  taxes  on capital  will  have  the  purported 
benefits.  The  central  statistical  conclusion  of Fazzari  and  Herzon  [1996],  in  a 
Levy  Institute  Public  Policy  Brief,  is particularly  devastating  in  this  regard. 
Looking  at the  consequences  of cutting  capital  gains  taxes  from  28%  to 
19.8%,  Fazzari  and  Herzon  found  that  this  would  increase  the  level  of GDP 
by  the  amount  that  it is  currently  growing  in  about  25-50  days.  This  can  be 
put  into  perspective  by  noting  three  things:  1) This  is  a one-time  effect  on 
GDP,  not  a permanent  increase  in  the  GDP  growth  rate;  so the  economy  is 
not  going  to be  growing  any  faster  in  the  long-run  after  cutting  capital  gains 
taxes  than  it was  before  they  were  cut;  2) even  this  trivial  effect  would  take 
about  ten  years  to  show  up  in the  economy;  and  3) even  these  tiny  effects  are 
based  on  highly  generous  estimates  of the  response  of investment  to a drop  in 
the  cost  of capital,  i.e.,  the  study  uses  an  estimate  that  a  1% drop  in the  cost 
of capital  will  cause  a 0.5%  increase  in  the  long-term  level  of the  capital  stock. 
As  the  authors  note  (p.  291, this  is  on the  high  side  of the  estimates 
reported  in  other  economists  work.  In fact,  that  other  work  indicates  that  the 
response  of investment  to  declines  in  the  cost  of capital  is probably  zero,  i.e., 
that  the  capital  stock  does  not  respond  at all  to the  cost  of capital.  Therefore, 
the  range  of estimates  for  this  effect  is  not  between,  say,  0.4  and  0.5,  so that 
Fazzari  and  Herzon’s  choice  of the  higher  estimate  could  be  argued  to be 
unimportant;  instead,  the  range  is between  0.5  and  0.0.  The  conclusion  that 
there  will  be  a one-time  increase  in GDP  of 25-50  days  growth,  therefore, 
should  be  seen  as  an  extreme  upper-bound,  rather  than  as  the  mid-point  of a 
range. 
Empirical  evidence  also  argues  for  extreme  skepticism  about  other 
page  5 proposals  to  reduce  the  tax  rate  on  capital.  For  example,  the  Investment  Tax 
Credit,  which  is  often  used  as  an  alternative  to capital  gains  tax  cuts,  is 
equally  unproven  in  creating  more  investment,  as  demonstrated  in  a Levy 
Institute  Public  Policy  Brief[Karier,  19941.  The  common  theme  between  the 
Fazzari/Herzon  and  Karier  conclusions  is that  they  are  both  looking  at  ways 
to reduce  the  cost  of capital;  and  since  investment  is  not  responsive  to the 
cost  of capital,  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  the  different  methods  of 
lowering  the  cost  of capital  are  similarly  ineffective. 
Moreover,  it is not  at all  clear  that  capital  is  over-taxed  in  the  U.S., 
relative  either  to our  own  past  or to other  industrialized  countries.  Gravelle 
[1994],  for  example,  argues  that  aggregate  effective  tax  rates  on  capital  have 
not  gone  up  since  the  enactment  of the  1986  tax  act.  She  writes  (p.  24): 
“Thus,  the  claim  for  a need  to lower  capital  income  tax  burdens  on  the 
grounds  that  increases  in  the  1986  Tax  Reform  Act  were  excessive  is not 
supported  by  this  measure  of the  effective  rate.”  Earlier,  she  notes  that  rates 
of capital  income  taxation  are  now  as low  as  they  have  ever  been  in  the 
United  States,  and  in  particular,  as low  as  they  were  in the  prosperous 
1960’s. 
For  international  comparisons,  Jorgenson  and  Landau  [ 19931  present 
estimates  of effective  tax  rates  for  1980,19&j,  and  1990  in  the  major 
industrialized  countries.  Interestingly,  these  estimates  show  that  the 
effective  tax  rates  on individual  assets  in the  U.S.  (as  elsewhere)  went  up  and 
down  dramatically  over  that  decade.  For  example,  the  effective  marginal  tax 
rate  on  tax-exempt  institutions  went  from  4.2%  to -1.2%  to  16.9%  in  the  three 
time  periods  noted.  Also,  most  types  of capital  had  a lower  effective  tax  rate 
in  the  U.S.  in  1985  than  in  1980  or  1990,  without  any  demonstrable  jump  in 
investment  in  the  1985-89  period,  relative  to  the  other  two  periods.  Finally, the  effective  tax  rate  in  the  U.S.  on key  assets  is  comparable  to the  rates  for 
our  two  major  competitors.  For  example,  the  effective  marginal  tax  rate  on 
machinery  is  (using  similar  assumptions  to produce  estimates  for  each 
country)  33.5%  in Japan,  39.8%  in Germany,  and  38.9%  in  the  U.S.  The  U.S. 
is hardly  non-competitive. 
The  fact  that  empirical  studies  have  failed  to  find  an  impact  of changing 
the  tax  treatment  of capital  on  rates  of investment  is easier  to  understand  if 
one  looks  more  carefully  at the  theoretical  work  that  has  been  done.  A great 
deal  of effort  has  gone  into  making  the  assumptions  of neo-classical  tax 
theory  more  realistic.  For  example,  it is possible  to extend  the  simple  model 
to investigate  the  effects  of recognizing  people’s  differing  preferences  with 
regard  to present  versus  future  consumption,  or to introduce  the  concept  of 
risk  and  uncertainty  into  the  models. 
Studies  of this  type  have  shown  that,  even  in  theory,  the  effect  of 
lowering  taxes  on  capital  is  ambiguous  in  terms  of its  effects  on  economic 
efficiency.  Gravelle  [1994]  notes  that  any  change  in  the  tax  system  which 
favors  capital  income  will  simultaneously  result  in  changes  in  other  taxes, 
spending,  and  deficit  levels.  How  these  other  changes  will  effect  the  economy 
is  entirely  ambiguous.  In fact,  Gravelle  shows  several  theoretical 
specifications  in  which  efficiency  is increased  by  raising  capital  taxes. 
Given  this,  it is  not  at all  clear  that  moving  to  a supposedly  capital- 
friendly  approach  will  have  the  desired  positive  effects-quite  aside  from  the 
many  negative  effects  of the  various  proposals.  Therefore,  the  remainder  of 
this  analysis  will  emphasize  the  effects  of the  various  tax  plans  on  the  budget 
deficit,  on various  groups  of taxpayers,  and  on  taxpaying  households  as  a 
group. B.  Revenue  Estimates  and Revenue Neutrality 
In the  charged  anti-deficit,  anti-tax  atmosphere  of Washington,  anyone 
with  a plan  to change  the  tax  system  must  claim  either  that  their  plan 
neither  decreases  nor  increases3  government  revenue,  that  their  plan  will 
lead  to  so much  growth  that  eventually  revenue  will  return  to its  current 
level,  or that  there  will  be  cuts  in  spending  to offset  the  losses  in  revenue 
entailed  by  the  tax  cut.  Several  of the  plans  under  discussion,  therefore,  has 
been  quite  deliberately  designed  to be  “revenue  neutral,”  with  rates  and 
levels  of deductions  chosen  to  ensure  that  the  new  system  raises  the  same 
amount  of revenue  that  the  current  system  would  collect. 
For  those  plans  that  are  claimed  to be  revenue-neutral,  how  can  one 
meaningfully  analyze  the  plans  on the  basis  of revenue  effects?  One  can  do 
two  things:  1)  consider  what  goes  into  the  basic  process  of making  any 
revenue  estimate;  and  2) analyze  whether  the  revenue  neutrality  masks 
distributional  effects  of the  tax  plan. 
Any  change  in  the  tax  law  will  generate  both  direct 
on tax  revenues.  Even  a simple  change  in  a very  specific 
and  indirect  effects 
tax  can  have 
multiple  effects  throughout  the  economy.  For  example,  if the  federal  excise 
tax  on  airplane  tickets  were  to be increased,  this  would  directly  increase  the 
tax  revenue  per  ticket  sold.  However,  it would  also  be  likely  to decrease  the 
total  number  of tickets  sold,  so that  estimating  the  revenue  effect  of  such  a 
change  would  necessarily  involve  a guess  as  to the  size  of the  ensuing  change 
3  Indeed,  even  more  than  the  risk  of raising  the  deficit,  the  risk  of creating  new 
and  bountiful  revenue  sources  for  the  government  has  become  a major  concern  for  many 
libertarians  on  the  political  right  [see,  for  example,  Mitchell,  19951. 
page  8 in ticket  sales. 
One  can  add  to this  uncertainty,  moreover,  several  “spillover”  effects: 
for  example,  the  decrease  in ticket  sales  could  decrease  total  flights  by  the 
airlines,  which  would  decrease  tax  revenues  from  airline  fuel  taxes  and  from 
any  laid-off  airline  employees’  income  and  payroll  taxes.  The  decreased  use  of 
airplanes,  however,  is likely  to be  accompanied  by  increases  in  driving  and 
train  trips,  which  will  increase  revenues  from  fuel  taxes,  tolls,  Amtrak 
receipts,  etc. 
Obviously,  the  possibilities  are virtually  endless.  In  the  case  of 
something  as  simple  as  a tax  on  one  item,  if one  believes  that  the  spillover 
effects  are  likely  to be  small,  one  can  simply  look  at  the  immediate  effect 
and-perhaps-also  at the  direct  behavioral  response  to the  price  rise. 
Indeed,  this  approach  is currently  mandated  by law.  When  analyzing 
the  net  change  in tax  revenue  due  to any  change  in  the  tax  code,  the  relevant 
government  agency  may  estimate  only  the  static  revenue  impact  plus-or- 
minus  the  most  direct  behavioral  impact  of the  change.  This  is  the  basis  of 
the  recent  debate  over  “dynamic  scoring,”  which  revolved  around  the 
potential  importance  of the  spillover  effects  of a tax  change,  as it works  its 
way  through  the  economy.  In the  case  of a fundamental  change  in  the  entire 
structure  of the  tax  system,  the  size  and  composition  of the  spillover  effects  is 
central  to the  debate. 
To  use  as  an  example  a national  sales  tax,  one  could  adopt  the  simple 
method  of multiplying  a tax  rate  (say,  17%) by  the  current  total  annual 
consumption  expenditures  in the  country  (almost  $5  trillion  currently, 
including  imputed  consumption  of owner-occupied  housing)  to get  an  estimate 
for  tax  revenue  of $850  billion,  which  is  about  $100  billion  less  than  is 
currently  being  collected.  However,  because  the  very  act  of taxing consumption  is  supposed  to reduce  consumption,  one  would  then  assume  that 
even  this  estimate  is too  high.  On  the  other  hand,  if the  tax  change  makes 
the  economy  much  more  prosperous,  it  might  raise  total  consumption  (even 
as it raises  saving  by  a proportionately  larger  amount)  and  thus  raise  total 
tax  revenue. 
The  list  of factors  that  are  potentially  important-but  operationally 
difficult  to  measure-is  seemingly  endless.  For  example:  How  much  tax 
evasion  would  a  17%  (or 32%  or 50%)  sales  tax  rate  engender?  How  much 
income  that  is  currently  hidden  will  be  declared  if the  tax  system  is  simpler? 
What  are  the  international  implications  of the  new  tax  system:  for  example, 
the  tax  treatment  of imports  and  exports,  and  the  further  effects  on the  value 
of the  dollar?  These  are  questions  to which  there  are  no  clear  answers.  It is 
by  no  means  certain,  moreover,  that  the  changes  will  conveniently  cancel 
each  other  out.  The  total  revenue  changes  are  potentially  substantial. 
One  of the  great  pitfalls  in  analyzing  these  tax  plans,  indeed,  is  caused 
by  the  multitude  of potential  effects  that  might  be  brought  into  any  analysis. 
For  example,  in  examining  the  effects  of their  plan  on  the  real  estate  sector, 
Hall  and  Rabushka  [1995]  claim  that  their  flat-tax  plan  will  lower  long-term 
interest  rates  by  three  points.  This,  along  with  a smaller  effect,  allows  them 
to  claim  that  the  negative  effects  on the  housing  market  from  eliminating 
mortgage  interest  deductions  will  be  exactly  offset  by  these  positive  effects, 
leaving  homeowners  equally  well-off  as they  were  under  the  current  tax 
system. 
Such  claims  might  best  be  called  “selective  general  equilibrium,”  in that 
they  claim  to look  at equilibrium  effects  that  are  beyond  the  initial  effects  of a 
tax  change;  but  they  are  not  based  on  an exhaustive  analysis  of the 
macroeconomic  interactions  caused  by  such  a fundamental  change. 
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the  range  of economic  changes  that  are  included  in  their  databases  (i.e.,  they 
would  not  be  useful  in predicting  the  effects  of changes  never  before  seen, 
such  as  interest  rates  of 40%  or,  more  relevant  to this  analysis,  the 
elimination  of all  tax  deductions),  even  they  would  not  produce  reliable 
estimates  when  modeling  a fundamental  change  in the  tax  system. 
Finally,  there  are  very  likely  to be important  short-term  effects 
associated  with  the  change  to a new  system.  For  example,  if consumption 
will  be  directly  taxed  as  of a certain  date,  people  are  apt  to  accelerate  their 
purchases  of consumption  items  to precede  that  date.  After  that  date,  then, 
there  will  be  a period  of artificially  low  sales  and  thus  low  tax  revenue  as 
people  use  up  the  surplus  consumption  goods  that  they  have  purchased.  This 
effect  is virtually  certain  to  spill  over  into  greater  general  economic 
uncertainty,  as  businesses  attempt  to  anticipate  and  respond  to  unusual  sales 
volatility  with  changes  in  their  purchases  of inputs  and  hiring  of workers. 
This  possibility  has  been  noted  by  officials  at the  Federal  Reserve  as being 
likely  to make  their  lives  much  more  difficult,  at least  in  the  short  term,  since 
they  would  try  to counter-act  any  unusual  movements  in  the  economy  with 
changes  in interest  rates. 
The  only  certainty  when  making  revenue  estimates,  therefore,  is  that 
bigger  changes  entail  bigger  uncertainties.  Keeping  the  basic  system  while 
eliminating  many  deductions  is very  similar  to the  approach  taken  with  the 
1986  Tax  Reform  Act.  We  have  evidence,  based  on  experience  following  1986, 
that  the  revenue  changes  were  relatively  small;  so one  can  have  reasonable 
confidence  in  the  reliability  of those  revenue  guesses.  On  the  other  hand, 
changing  to  a flat  tax  would  involve  much  more  uncertainty,  while  changing 
to  a VAT  or  a national  sales  tax  would  be  still  more  uncertain-not  least 
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from  tax  treatment  in  those  systems.  Thus,  it is quite  possible  that  these 
plans  would  not  turn  out  to be  revenue  neutral. 
In a recent  assessment  of dynamic  scoring,  Auerbach  [1996]  lists  all  of 
the  ways  that  the  current  method  of producing  revenue  estimates  could  be 
“enhanced,”  from  incentive  effects  to  demand-side  effects  to intertemporal 
effects  (from  Real  Business  Cycle  models),  and  more.  He  also  points  out  that 
these  new  estimates  would  have  to rely  on further  assumptions  regarding  off- 
setting  policy  changes,  and  (in  order  to be  truly  exhaustive)  they  would  also 
need  to make  assumptions  about  legal  and  social  effects  of policy  changes. 
In  the  abstract,  these  considerations  are  potentially  amenable  to 
modeling,  with  the  only  concern  being  the  cost-benefit  ratio  involved.  For 
example,  if the  inclusion  of the  effect  of a fiscal  policy  change  on  church 
donations  takes  $1  million  worth  of government  economists’  time,  only  to 
improve  the  revenue  estimates  by  0.0000001%,  one  might  well  decide  that  not 
every  behavioral  response  is worth  estimating.  One  might  argue  (again,  in 
the  abstract)  that  some  dynamic  factors  should  be  taken  into  account,  but 
only  those  that  are  “big”  in  a meaningful  sense. 
However,  Auerbach  argues  against  that  conclusion,  pointing  out  that 
the  abstract  world  implied  by  such  technical  analysis  is irrelevant  to the  real 
issues  at hand  today:  “...  [I]n  the  intense  political  environment  in  which 
estimates  are  produced  and  used,  and  given  the  unavoidable  uncertainties  of 
compiling  such  forecasts,  it  seems  likely  that  fully  dynamic  forecasts  may  end 
up being  even  more  biased  and  inaccurate  than  the  forecasts  of the  last  few 
years.”  [p.  1571 
Therefore,  the  three  possibilities  (that  revenues  would  go  up,  that 
revenues  would  go  down,  and  that  revenues  would  remain  the  same> must  at 
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restructuring.4 
C.  Double-Taxation 
The  term  “double-taxation”  has  become  a central  point  of concern  for 
many  tax  analysts  [see  Hall  and  Rabushka  for  a description].  In its  most 
limited  form,  this  term  describes  the  levying  of a corporate  income  tax  at  the 
level  of the  firm  followed  by  a personal  income  tax  if the  remaining  profits  are 
paid  out  as  dividends.  The  term  has  now  become,  however,  a much  more 
broad  complaint  about  the  entire  tax  system  [see,  e.g.,  Mitchell,  19951. 
A genuine  concern  with  double  taxation  should  be  separated  into  two 
parts.  First,  there  is the  question  of the  total  effective  tax  on any  particular 
flow  of money.  Second,  one  should  also  be  concerned  with  whether  any 
particular  method  of collecting  taxes  creates  unwanted  inefficiencies.  When 
dealing  with  the  first  question,  it  should  be  clear  that  in most  cases  what 
matters  is  not  how  many  times  something  is taxed  but  rather  how  much  total 
tax  is collected. 
Most  people  would,  no  doubt,  rather  pay  $50  in  tax  four  times  than  pay 
$1000  in  tax  once.  Much  more  important  are  the  efficiency  effects  of double- 
taxation,  which  have  been  the  subject  of an  extensive  literature  [reviewed 
very  well  in  Gravelle,  19941.  While  there  is little  agreement  on  the  overall 
efficiency  effects  (especially  the  size  of any  effects)  of these  tax  artifacts,  it is 
undeniably  true  that  there  are  some  inefficiencies  of this  sort  caused  by  the 
tax  system.  Those  inefficiencies,  however,  need  to be  weighed  against  the 
costs  of changing  the  entire  tax  system.  Using  them  as  an  excuse  to change 
4  For  an  argument  in favor  of using  dynamic  scoring,  see  Mitchell  119961. 
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It is  also  true  that  multiple  taxation  is not  limited  to capital  income. 
Currently,  labor  income  is  taxed  by  the  Federal  government  twice,  once  by 
the  Social  Security  system,  and  once  by  the  income  tax.  (One  could  even 
argue  that  there  is triple-taxation,  if one  includes  the  employers’ 
contributions  to  Social  Security.)  Eliminating  this  was  part  of the  Dole  tax 
plan  in its  early  stages  of discussion,  but  it was  dropped  from  the  final 
campaign  proposal. 
Even  the  transition  to a consumption  tax  would  create  a severe  case  of 
double-taxation.  In the  years  when  there  is  still  an income  tax,  people  pay 
tax  on their  incomes.  However,  anyone  who  puts  some  of their  remaining 
money  into  a mutual  fund,  then  withdraws  the  proceeds  and  spends  them 
after  the  changeover  to the  consumption  tax,  would  pay  tax  on  that  money 
again.  Double  taxation  would  be  part  of the  system  so long  as  anyone  had 
money  on  deposit  from  before  the  tax  regime  changed.  (See  below  for  further 
discussion  of issues  relevant  to the  transition  from  one  tax  system  to the 
other. 1 
The  problem  with  the  language  of double  taxation  is  that  it is possible 
to  extend  it to virtually  any  situation.  Since  the  economy  is  a system  of 
flows-incomes  flowing  to households  and  businesses,  deposits  and 
withdrawals  flowing  into  and  out  of financial  institutions-one  can  describe 
nearly  anything  as  multiple  taxation  by  looking  at the  history  of the 
transaction.  A business  can  claim  that  any  business  tax  amounts  to  double 
taxation,  for  example,  because  the  money  flowing  in  as  revenues  was 
previously  subject  to  sales  tax  and,  prior  to that,  income  tax. 
A  strong  version  of such  disingenuous  reasoning  is  found  in the  Kemp 
Commission’s  report  [National  Commission  on Economic  Growth  and  Tax 
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Saving  and  Investment.”  Describing  a family  which  has  earned  $1000,  paid 
$280  of that  in  federal  income  taxes,  and  decided  to invest  the  $720 
remaining,  the  report  describes  four  levels  of tax:  “First,  they  already  had  to 
pay  income  taxes  to  have  the  $720  to invest.  Second,  the  company  in  which 
they  invest  will  generally  pay  tax  at  a 35  percent  rate  on  the  returns  on  the 
amount  invested.  Third,  if the  company  pays  dividends,  the  family  will  pay 
a 28 percent  tax  on  the  dividends  they  receive.  Alternatively,  if the  company 
retains  the  after  tax  income  for  reinvestment  or finds  other  ways  to boost 
future  earnings,  the  stock  price  will  rise.  The  future  earnings  will  be  taxed, 
and  if the  family  sells  the  stock,  it will  pay  a capital  gains  tax  at  a 28  percent 
rate.  .  .  .  Fourth,  if they  hold  the  proceeds  of the  sale  until  death,  they  will  be 
subject  to an  estate  tax  that  can  go  as high  as  55  percent.”  [Bold-face  in 
original.] 
This  “quadruple  taxation”  is  contrasted  with  the  single  taxation  that 
would  result  if the  family  had  decided  to spend  the  $720  on  a trip  to 
Disneyland  rather  than  to  save  it.  What  is not  stated  is  that  one  could  just  as 
easily  follow  the  path  of money  spent  on  consumption  and  claim  multiple 
taxation  through  similar  reasoning:  Disney  uses  the  money  to  pay  its 
employees,  who  pay  social  security  tax  and  income  tax,  spending  the 
remainder  on  clothes,  paying  (in  most  states)  sales  tax,  with  the  clothing 
company  paying  profits  taxes  and  paying  its  employees,  etc.  Using  this 
method  of counting,  it is  possible  to  claim  that  any  flow  of money  is  taxed  an 
infinite  number  of times. 
What  makes  that  type  of reasoning  wrong,  of course,  is  that  the 
different  taxes  are  being  levied  due  to different  economic  events.  The  second 
and  third  levels  of tax  noted  above,  for  example,  are  not  taxes  on  the  $720  but 
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not  being  re-taxed. 
This  logic  has  reached  an  extreme  in the  case  of the  estate  and  gift  tax, 
which  is  the  fourth  level  of tax  described  by  the  Kemp  report.  Several  plans 
exclude  estates  and  gifts  entirely  from  taxation  on the  basis  that  this,  too,  is 
double  taxation.  Since  the  term  double-taxation  is  so difficult  to pin  down, 
however,  it is  difficult  to argue  with  the  logic  on  these  grounds:  whatever 
money  went  into  an  estate  or a gift  probably  was  taxed  at  some  point,  and 
maybe  even  at more  than  one  point.  The  inheritance  tax,  however,  can  be 
defended  not  as  a continuation  of taxation  on  a flow  of income  but  as  a way  to 
recapture  part  of a stock  of wealth  that  would  otherwise  be  passed  to  heirs 
who  have  done  nothing-“entrepreneurial”  or otherwise-to  benefit  the 
economy. 
Moreover,  most  specialists  in  taxation  consider  the  current  estate  and 
gift  taxes  to be  too  low  rather  than  too  high.  As  one  of the  country’s  most 
prominent  tax  experts  has  noted:  “Although  tax  theorists  almost 
unanimously  agree  that  taxation  of wealth  transfers  [estate  and  gift  taxes] 
should  play  a larger  role  in  the  revenue  system,  they  have  not  been  successful 
in  convincing  Congress.”  [Pechman,  19861  More  estate  and  gift  taxation 
should  be  the  preferred  direction,  not  less. 
The  issue  of double  taxation  has  an important,  though  limited,  role  to 
play  in  tax  debates.  However,  the  issue  is currently  being  over-used  to the 
point  of  abuse.  The  appropriate  questions  remain  the  total  amount  of taxes 
levied  and  the  efficiency  effects  that  they  cause. 
II.  Outlines  of  the  Mqjor  Plans 
As  noted  above,  there  are  four  classifications  for  the  types  of tax  plans 
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exempt  taxes,  and  labor-income  taxes.  These  will  be  described  in  turn. 
A.  The  10% Tax  (or:  Sweeping  Out  the Stables) 
The  only  detailed  plan  for  fundamental  change  in the  tax  code  that 
maintains  an  emphasis  on income  taxation  (as  opposed  to  consumption 
taxation)  offered  thus  far is from  House  Minority  Leader  Richard  Gephardt. 
His  plan,  which  he labels  (in  something  of a misnomer,  since  it has  more  than 
one tax  bracket)  the  “10%  Tax  Plan,”  is an  attempt  to  remove  the  complexity 
from  the  current  tax  code,  thus  expanding  the  tax  base  and  lowering  tax 
rates-while  maintaining  a progressive  rate  structure. 
Under  this  plan,  all  income,  both  earned  and  unearned,  is taxable  for  a 
majority  of taxpayers  at  a flat  ten  percent  rate;  at relatively  high  incomes 
($40,200  of taxable  income  for  a family  of four,  after  subtracting  $19,350  in 
exemptions,  i.e.,  a gross  income  of $59,550)  the  marginal  tax  rate  rises 
progressively,  to  20,  26,  32,  and  finally  34 percent  for  taxable  income  over 
$264,450.  The  only  deduction  that  would  be  maintained  would  be  the 
mortgage  interest  deduction.  The  Gephardt  plan  is  relatively  mute  when  it 
comes  to business  taxes,  with  the  exception  of a few  smaller  items  like 
personal  deductions  for job-related  expenses  (which  are  re-classified  as 
adjustments  to income). 
The  Gephardt  plan  is generally  not  implicated  in  the  discussions  about 
raising  national  saving,  since  it is  explicitly  not  attempting  to punish 
consumption  or encourage  saving  (except  inasmuch  as greater  simplification 
might  affect  people’s  overall  behavior).  The  Gephardt  plan  will  be  featured, 
however,  in  the  discussions  of simplicity  and  political  reality  in  Section  III. 
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Value-Added  Taxes  (VAT’s),  common  in Europe,  are  business  taxes 
which  are  levied  at  each  stage  of the  production  process.  A  simple  example 
would  be  the  production  of bread,  where  each  stage  of the  bread’s  production 
adds  value  to the  basic  product:  seed  becomes  wheat,  wheat  becomes  flour, 
flour  becomes  bread,  bread  is packaged,  the  packaged  bread  is  sold  to the 
wholesaler,  the  wholesaler  sells  to the  retailer,  and  the  retailer  sells  to the 
customer.  Each  of those  steps  turns  something  that  was  worth  relatively 
little  into  something  worth  more.  The  VAT  system  taxes  each  participant  in 
the  process  a certain  percentage  of the  difference  between  the  cost  of their 
inputs  and  the  revenue  from  their  outputs. 
In  a pure  VAT,  the  tax  would  be  levied  on all  products,  including 
products  that  end  up  as investment  goods  (bulldozers,  buildings,  etc.).  In 
that  sense,  therefore,  the  VAT  is not  a tax  on  consumption.  Since  most 
proponents  of the  VAT  intend  to have  it work  as  a tax  on  consumption, 
however,  they  must  make  sure  that  the  tax  is  not  levied  on the  items  that 
they  wish  to favor  (i.e.,  investment  goods).  The  only  way  to make  the  VAT 
“investment  friendly”  is to create  an Exemptions  List,  which  determines 
which  items  will  not  be  subject  to tax  or which  will  be  subject  to preferential 
tax  rates.  In practice  in  Europe,  this  has  resulted  in a bewilderingly  complex 
system,  the  complexity  of which  is  effectively  hidden  from  the  consumer. 
Unlike  sales  taxes,  VAT’s  are  not  added  on to  the  sales  price  at  the  cash 
register,  but  are  already  included  in it;  so a consumer  does  not  know  whether 
an  item  is  tax-preferred  or not.  Deciding  what  is  and  is not  taxable  is  an 
important  part  of any  tax  system,  including  the  other  types  of tax  plans 
discussed  here.  The  advantage  of the  VAT  is that  it makes  these  choices 
page 18 explicit. 
A major  problem  with  the  concept  of the  value-added  tax,  however,  is 
that  the  term  is too  broad  to be  useful.  It can  be  used  in terms  so  general 
that  many  tax  systems  that  are  seemingly  unrelated  to the  VAT  can, 
nevertheless,  be  called  a VAT.  For  example,  the  flat  tax  (discussed  below) 
can  fairly  be  described  as  “precisely  a value-added  tax,  plus  a rebate  of taxes 
to families  based  on  their  labor  income  and  family  size.”  [Slemrod,  19951  A 
broad-based  income  tax,  similarly,  could  be  described  as  a VAT,  plus  a 
supplemental  tax  on  saving.  Most  people  think  of a VAT  as  a national  sales 
tax,  when  in  fact  a national  sales  tax  is merely  one  type  of VAT.  Therefore, 
even  using  the  term  VAT  is ill-advised.  For  the  purposes  of this  analysis, 
therefore,  VAT  will  not  be  used  as  a descriptive  category,  with  the  analysis 
centered  on the  only  type  of VAT  that  has  been  seriously  proposed  for  the 
U.S.-a  national  sales  tax. 
Other  than  the  income  tax,  perhaps  the  most  familiar  tax  to most 
Americans  is  the  sales  tax.  Repealing  the  entire  tax  code  and  replacing  it 
with  a national  sales  tax  has  become  a goal  of several  prominent  politicians, 
including  former  Republican  Presidential  candidate  Senator  Richard  Lugar  of 
Indiana  and  House  Ways  and  Means  Committee  Chairman  Bill  Archer  (R- 
Tex.)  (who  has  refused  to  endorse  any  particular  approach  to  tax  reform, 
except  to  say  that  he  favors  any  kind  of consumption  tax  scheme).  Senator 
Lugar’s  plan  would  have  imposed  a national  rate  of  17%  on  all  final 
purchases,  meaning  that  all  saved  income  would  be  exempt  from  taxation. 
National  sales  taxes  have  been  attacked  on  several  grounds.  One  of the 
most  basic  problems  is  the  claim  that  the  sales  tax  can  be  collected  by 
existing  state-level  agencies,  allowing  a complete  shut-down  the  Internal 
Revenue  Service  (certainly  a crowd-pleasing  notion).  Since  the  IRS  also 
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(R-Fla.)  and  the  staff  of the  Joint  Economic  Committee  have  calculated  that  it 
would  be  necessary  to  have  a sales  tax  rate  of between  32  and  50  percent  to 
make  up  for  all  of the  tax  revenue  lost  by  eliminating  all  other  types  of taxes. 
Moreover,  five  states  that  currently  levy  no  sales  tax  would  be  forced  to 
create  their  own  tax-collection  bureaucracies  from  scratch.  Without  a 
funding  mechanism,  however,  this  would  be  tantamount  to an  “unfunded 
mandate,”  which  Congress  overwhelmingly  voted  to discontinue  in  1995). 
A final  concern  with  a national  sales  tax  is that,  once  again,  the  difficult 
political  decisions  (and  the  complexity)  will  come  when  the  tax  base  is 
defined.  Should  educational  expenses  be  taxed  as  consumption  or  exempted 
as  investment  in  human  capital.  What  about  preventive  personal  health 
maintenance?  These  decisions  would  be  the  grist  of future  tax  debates  for 
future  elections,  just  as  discussions  of personal  exemptions  and  exclusions 
dominate  elections  today. 
C.  Saving-Exempt  Taxes 
A plan  which  is  much  more  directly  “pro-saving”  is the  USA  Tax  plan, 
proposed  by  Senators  Sam  Nunn  (D-Ga.)  and  Pete  Domenici  (R-N.M.).  This 
plan  is essentially  a “universal  IRA”  plan,  in that  it allows  people  to put  as 
much  money  as  they  want  into  a saving  vehicle  and  not  pay  taxes  on  that 
money  until  they  withdraw  the  money  at a later  date.  If a person  earns 
$20,000  and  saves  none  of it,  therefore,  they  would  pay  the  same  in  current 
taxes  as  a person  who  earns  $50,000  and  saves  $30,000  of it.  The  rate 
structure  would  include  three  rates:  15,20,  and  40  percent.  On  the  business 
tax  side,  the  USA  Tax  would,  like  the  two  flat  tax  plans,  levy  a flat  tax  rate 
on net  cash  flow.  In the  Nunn/Domenici  plan,  the  flat  rate  would  be  ll%, 
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The  USA  Tax  retains  the  deductions  for  mortgage  interest  and 
charitable  contributions,  but  it eliminates  the  deductions  for  state  and  local 
taxes.  Significantly,  however,  it introduces  a “higher  education”  deduction, 
treating  expenditures  for tuition  at colleges  and  universities,  junior  colleges, 
and  various  technical  training  schools  as an  expensable  investment  rather 
than  consumption.  If for  no  other  reason,  therefore,  the  USA  Tax  is 
significant  in  including  such  a straightforward  incentive  to invest  in  human 
capital,  a feature  that  is sadly  lacking  from  the  current  tax  code  and  in  all  of 
the  other  proposals. 
The  rate  structure  for  personal  taxes  is  actually  less  steep  than  it 
appears,  since  the  USA  Tax  would  allow  deductions  for  payroll  taxes  (Social 
Security  and  Medicare).  With  these  credits  included,  the  three  rates  are 
reduced  to  11%  (for  taxable  income  up  to  $5,400  for  married  filers),  19% 
($5,400-$24,000),  and  32%  ($24,000  and  over).  With  the  cutoff  points  as  low 
as  they  are,  moreover,  the  progressivity  of the  system  would  be  much  less 
than  even  the  top  rate  of 32%  would  imply,  since  larger  and  larger  portions  of 
income  would  be  saved  (and  thus  untaxed)  as personal  income  rises. 
Look,  for  example,  at  a person  with  $50,000  in gross  income  with 
$25,000  in  taxable  income  (after  subtracting  family  exemptions,  savings, 
college  tuition,  mortgage  interest,  and  charitable  contributions).  If that 
person  earned  and  consumed  another  $1,000,  their  tax  bill  would  rise  by 
$320,  because  their  marginal  tax  rate  is 32%.  On  the  other  hand,  if a higher 
income  person  earned  an  extra  $1000,  it is much  more  likely  that  they  would 
save  much  or  all  of it,  meaning  that  they  face  a lower  tax  burden  on marginal 
income.  The  difference  in tax  burden  implies  that  the  middle-income  person 
would  face  a higher  tax  rate  merely  because  they  have  not  reached  the  point 
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that  implies  a relative  work  disincentive  for  the  person  whose  consumption 
needs  are  the  most  immediate,  since  their  effective  tax  rate  is  higher. 
Finally,  the  USA  Tax  is unique  in that  it has  already  been  written!  It is 
a fully  detailed  document,  including  transition  rules  from  the  current  system. 
While  this  makes  the  bill  nearly  300  pages  long,  it also  makes  it a more 
serious  effort  at  dealing  with  the  complexity  of the  economy.  While  it will 
most  likely  never  be  adopted  in its  current  form,  it provides  many  useful 
ideas  and  details  that  can  be  adapted  to other  proposals. 
D.  The Flat Tax 
House  Majority  Leader  Dick  Armey  (R-Tex.)  and  Senator  Shelby  CR- 
AIa.)  have  proposed  a flat  tax  plan  that  eliminates  all  deductions  and 
replaces  them  with  high  personal  exemptions  (roughly  $37,000  for  a family  of 
four)  and  which  then  taxes  the  result  at a rate  of  17%  (although  the  rate  is 
20%  for  the  first  year  of the  plan).  Significantly,  the  ArmeyShelby  plan  only 
taxes  labor  income  (wages  and  salaries)  and  does  not  tax  income  from 
property  (interest,  dividends,  or capital  gains).  On  the  business  side,  taxes 
are  levied  (also  at  17%)  on net  cash  flow,  i.e.,  business  revenue  after 
subtracting  all  expenses  for  wages,  benefits,  and  investment.  This  will 
effectively  mean  that  all investment  spending  is  fully  expensed,  that  is,  100% 
depreciated  in  the  year  that  it is incurred. 
Most  flat-tax  plans  are  based  on  the  proposal  by  Professors  Robert  Hall 
and  Alvin  Rabushka  of the  Hoover  Institution  [see  Hall  and  Rabushka,  19951. 
Some  proponents  would  maintain  the  deductions  for mortgage  interest  and 
charitable  contributions  -although  the  only  apparent  reason  for  keeping 
these  deductions  is  to make  the  plan  more  politically  acceptable.  To  pay  for 
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exemptions  and/or  a higher  flat  rate  on  all taxable  income. 
A flat  tax  does  not  overtly  reward  saving;  only  the  income  one  earns 
from  saving  and  investment  is exempted  from  tax.  Thus,  the  “cost  of  saving” 
is  decreased  (or,  equivalently,  the  cost  of consumption  is increased)  at the 
individual  level,  as  one  can  earn  a greater  after-tax  rate  of return  on  any 
amount  of saving  at  a particular  interest  rate.  (That  the  plan  itself  would 
lower  interest  rates  is a claim  also  made  by  Hall  and  Rabushka,  as  noted 
above.) 
The  sponsors  of the  Flat  Tax  plans  claim  that  the  overall  effect  of their 
systems  would  be  progressive  despite  their  flat  rate  structure-due  to the 
generous  exemptions  which  reduce  the  proportion  of income  subject  to  tax. 
Nevertheless,  it is  worth  remembering  that  these  plans  are  still  committed  to 
the  notion  that  the  maximum  tax  rate  on any  income  should  be  no  more  than 
a certain  percentage-in  ArmeyBhelby’s  case,  17%.  This  means  that  the 
country  would  be  moving  to a system  in which  a person  with  a million  dollars 
in  annual  income  would  find  their  next  dollar  of labor  income  taxed  at  a 
maximum  of  17%  instead  of the  current  39.6%.5  While  this  is  a choice  that 
people  might  prefer,  it is by  no  means  certain  that  it would  be  the  popular 
choice.  It is  at  least  important,  however,  to be  clear  on  this  basic  fact. 
Finally,  the  flat  tax,  despite  the  claims  of its  proponents  that  it is  a 
completely  worked-out  plan,  still  has  one  major  gap.  Even  after  years  of 
analysis  and  discussion,  proponents  of the  flat  tax  do not  know  how  they 
would  tax  financial  services.  That  is,  how  does  one  tax  “net  cash  flow”  when 
5  Their next dollar of capital  income,  of course, would not be taxed at all-or,  to 
put it in Hall and Rabushka’s  terms, it would be taxed before it was received as income. 
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business  it is  to turn  over  large  flows  of cash?  Certainly,  a bank’s  revenues 
could  not  include  all  of its  deposits,  since  it is merely  holding  that  money  for 
someone  else.  Therefore,  it is not  at  all  clear  how  the  flat-taxers  would  tax 
banks  or other  financial  corporations.  This  is,  to  say  the  least,  a matter  of 
some  concern  for  anyone  who  would  suggest  that  the  country  should  rewrite 
its  entire  tax  code  in  favor  of a flat  tax. 
As  part  of an  early  attempt  to deal  with  intra-party  disputes  regarding 
tax  reform,  House  Speaker  Gingrich  and  former  Senate  Majority  Leader  Dole 
appointed  a committee  to  study  and  to make  recommendations  on 
overhauling  the  federal  income  tax  system.  While  its  official  title,  the 
National  Commission  on Economic  Growth  and  Tax  Reform,  might  make  it 
appear  that  this  was  a panel  of technical  experts  hired  by  the  government  to 
make  recommendations,  the  panel  was  entirely  a creation  of the  Republican 
Congressional  leadership. 
As  soon  as  former  Congressman  Jack  Kemp  (who,  obviously,  did  not 
know  at  the  time  that  he  was  later  to become  the  Vice  Presidential  nominee) 
was  designated  its  chairman,  it was  widely  expected  that  the  Commission 
would  endorse  the  flat  tax,  long  a political  project  of Mr.  Kemp.  When  the 
report  was  finally  released,  the  only  surprise  was  that  the  Commission 
supplied  no  numbers  for  its  flat  tax  plans.  It did,  however,  explicitly  endorse 
the  framework  of a flat  tax,  from  the  single  rate  provision  to the  large 
personal  exemptions  to  the  labor  income  base  (and  companion  business  cash 
flow  tax>. 
Moreover,  the  commission  effectively  abandoned  any  pretext  of 
page  24 impartiality  throughout.  For  example,  the  report  refers  to those  who  might 
disagree  with  the  conclusions  of the  commission  as “defenders  of the  status 
quo”  and  later  as “complainers.”  Also,  the  report  was  issued  along  with  ten 
companion  papers  which  discussed  various  aspects  of the  current  tax  code 
and  the  commission’s  recommendations,  none  of which  was  written  by  an 
academic  economist  of national  reputation-not  even  one  with  well- 
established  conservative  credentials,  such  as  Martin  Feldstein  or Michael 
Boskin.  Instead,  the  four  authors  (each  of whom  wrote  more  than  one  of the 
companion  pieces)  are  affiliated  with  conservative  think-tanks  whose  views 
on tax  policy  were  already  widely  known  to be  congenial  to the  leanings  of the 
commission. 
The  report,  in  fact,  could  easily  be  mistaken  for  an  excerpt  from  any  of 
Mr.  Kemp’s  previous  writings  on  the  subject,  in  which  he  has  fervently  laid 
out  a case  for  a flat  tax.  With  chapter  titles  like  “Imagine  an America...”  and 
“At  the  Boiling  Point,”  this  was  an  uncritical  advertisement  for  supply-side 
economics-e.g.,  assertions  that  the  economy  will  grow  faster  due  to tax  cuts 
on business,  not  because  of the  spending  that  such  cuts  will  create,  but 
because  the  creative  impulses  of entrepreneurs  will  be  “unleashed”  by  the 
lower  tax  rates.  Arguments  for “dynamic  scoring”  also  received  prominent 
play  in  the  final  report. 
As  a political  document,  therefore,  the  Kemp  group’s  report  is  an 
interesting  repetition  of the  state  of thinking  of the  sub-group  of the 
Republican  party  that  is  currently  dominating  economic  policy  discussions. 
As  a balanced  and  exhaustive  analysis  of the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of the 
current  tax  system  (or  of the  many  proposals  for  reform),  however,  it is 
irrelevant. 
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Perhaps  the  most  striking  facts  about  the  proponents  of the  various  tax 
plans  described  above  are  their  failures  on  two  counts:  first,  to  recognize  that 
there  is  more  to  the  U.S.  fiscal  system  than  just  the  federal  income  tax 
system,  and  second,  that  it is not  possible  to build  a tax  system  which  does 
not  “distort”  the  economy. 
A.  The Entire  Tax System is Complicated  and Extensive 
Perhaps  the  most  under-appreciated  fact  in the  current  debate  over 
restructuring  the  tax  system  is that  the  federal  income  tax  is only  one  part  of 
the  federal  tax  system,  and  the  federal  tax  system  is only  one  part  of the 
entire  tax  system.  There  are  over  83,000  entities  in this  country  with  the 
legal  power  to tax.  Designing  a federal  income  tax  or even  an  entire  tax 
system  for  the  federal  government  to achieve  some  ideal  level  of simplicity 
and  efficiency  is made  much  more  difficult  when  one  must  consider 
interactions  among  taxing  jurisdictions. 
At  the  federal  level,  the  part  of the  tax  system  that  is left  largely 
untouched  by  virtually  all  current  proposals  is the  Social  Security  tax 
contributions  by  individuals  and  businesses.  Since  the  Social  Security  tax  is, 
by  design,  regressive,  6 the  rest  of the  federal  system  must  be  designed  with 
6  This  is true  for  two  reasons:  first,  this  tax  is only  levied  on  earned  income, 
and  second,  it is  a single-rate  tax  on  all  earned  income  up to roughly  $60,000  in income,  at 
which  point  the  marginal  rate  becomes  zero  and  the  average  rate  approaches  zero  as income 
rises.  The  latter  point  is no  longer  true  for  Medicare  contributions,  which  do  not  have  an 
upper  cutoff  for  income. 
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At  the  non-federal  level,  most  taxes  are  levied  as  sales  taxes,  which  are 
by  their  very  nature  regressive.  In addition,  most  anti-externality  taxes  are 
regressive  (e.g.,  taxes  on  cigarettes,  alcohol,  and  gasoline),  despite  the 
positive  social  goals  which  they  are  designed  to achieve.  Since  the  rest  of the 
tax  system  is  already  regressive,  therefore,  changing  the  federal  tax  system 
in  a way  that  leaves  it any  less  progressive  will  turn  the  whole  system  into  an 
even  more  regressive  method  of raising  revenue. 
The  goal,  therefore,  should  be  to make  the  Federal  tax  system  as  or 
more  progressive  than  it is today.  Simply  meeting  the  goal  of being,  on  its 
own,  progressive  is inadequate,  since  even  a range  of effective  tax  rates 
starting  at  10%  and  rising  to  10.1%  meets  the  dictionary  definition  of 
progressivity.  To  couple  that  type  of federal  system  with  the  rest  of the  tax 
system,  therefore,  is to  guarantee  a net  increase  in regressivity. 
B.  Incentives  and  Social  Engineering 
One  aspect  of the  “perfect  tax  code”  notion  that  underlies  much  of the 
current  debate  is the  idea  that  the  tax  code  could  be  made  neutral,  i.e.,  that 
people  could  make  decisions  not  on the  basis  of tax  considerations  but  on  the 
basis  of their  personal  desires  and  the  possibilities  of a free  marketplace. 
Once  again,  however,  this  notion  is not  grounded  in economic  reality.  How 
could  the  U.S.  government  have  collected  over  $1.4 trillion  dollars  in  1995 
(over  one-fifth  of personal  income)  without  affecting  people’s  behavior?  It is 
simply  not  possible. 
Economics  is the  study  of human  responses  to incentives.  As  such, 
every  institutional  structure  is analyzed  to find  the  incentives  and 
disincentives  that  it  embodies.  This  is particularly  true  of the  tax  system- 
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The  key  fact  which  emerges  from  all  such  analyses  is  that  it is not  possible  to 
construct  a tax  system  without  incentives  and  disincentives. 
This  is  why  economists  have  invented  the  concept  of the  “lump-sum 
tax”-a  hypothetical  construction  that  is based  on  the  acknowledged 
impossibility  of raising  tax  revenue  without  altering  (or,  as it is  more 
commonly  described,  distorting)  human  behavior.  This  invention  was 
necessary  because  it  allows  economists  to analyze  other  questions  without 
having  to  consider  the  behavioral  responses  to taxes,  as in,  “Suppose  that  we 
have  an increase  in government  spending  on public  highways,  financed  by  a 
lump-sum  tax...”  No  one  could  seriously  claim  that  a non-distorting  tax  exists 
or could  be  invented;  the  point  is  simply  to say  that  the  question  under 
discussion  is  the  effects  of the  highway  expenditures,  with  the  responses  to 
taxes  assumed  away  for  simplicity. 
It is,  therefore,  impossible  to claim  that  any  tax  system  will  be  “neutral” 
with  regard  to  the  economy.  No  system  will  allow  the  economy  to move  to 
some  state  of nature  in  which  all human  decisions  are  led  by  the  invisible 
hand.  Even  the  simplest  of tax  systems,  the  “head  tax”  (where  every  person 
pays  exactly  the  same  number  of dollars  per  year,  no  matter  what  their 
situation-or  what  the  British  call  a “poll  tax”),  creates  incentives  and 
disincentives.  For  example,  some  people  might  respond  to such  a tax  by 
legally  “disappearing,”  that  is,  by  altering  their  behavior  in  ways  that  allow 
them  to  pay  no  tax.  This  involves  making  choices  to give  up  some  activities 
that  are  more  likely  to  result  in discovery. 
Moreover,  this  tax  system  would  create  a clear  disincentive  to  having 
children  (although,  as  always,  the  magnitude  and  effect  of that  disincentive  is 
unclear),  since  every  child  would  create  a tax  liability  without  being  able  to 
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a certain  age  would  create  other  behavioral  distortions-lying  about  the  ages 
of one’s  children,  artificial  incentives  to throw  children  out  of the  household 
on  a certain  date,  etc.) 
The  dream  of the  non-distorting  tax  is,  therefore,  forever  to  remain 
unrealized.  Of  course,  this  is not  to deny  that  some  tax  systems  are  more 
transparent  than  others  in how  they  alter  behavior.  Even  if it is not  possible 
to be  perfectly  neutral,  it is at least  possible  to be  simpler  than  the  current 
tax  code.  Increased  transparency  should  not  be  automatically  equated  with 
decreased  distortion,  however.  For  example,  a perfectly  transparent  tax  that 
would  levy  a  100%  rate  on  all  commercial  transactions  in  the  state  of Texas 
would  hardly  lead  to small  distortions. 
The  argument  against  the  current  tax  code  is  often  made  on  the  basis  of 
its  supposed  built-in  disincentives  to save.  For  example,  until  1986,  the  tax 
code  allowed  interest  on  consumer  borrowing  to be  deducted  from  taxable 
income,  which  created  a clear  incentive  (in  theory)  to spend  rather  than  to 
save.  This  is  one  reason  why,  for  example,  the  tax-preferred  treatment  of 
IRA’s  and  pensions  is broadly  popular  among  politicians  of both  parties.  It is 
also  why  the  tax  deduction  for interest  on consumer  debt  was  phased  out- 
with  no  discernible  impact  on the  saving  rate,  which  continued  to decline. 
The  crucial  point,  however,  is that  the  more  radical  tax  reform 
proposals  wipe  out  the  existing  tax  code,  including  all  of its  disincentives  (and 
incentives)  regarding  saving.  Then,  starting  from  a blank  slate,  they  tax 
consumption  only.  This  is,  therefore,  quite  clearly  “social  engineering,”  with 
the  self-appointed  tax  engineers  making  the judgment  that  the  economy 
would  be  better  off with  a larger  amount  of saving  than  the  private  economy 
would  naturally  produce. 
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saving  need  to be  followed  by  years  of artificially-high  saving  (an  arguable 
proposition,  at best),  that  would  imply  that  there  would  be  some  point  at 
which  consumption  should  no longer  be  penalized.  This  is  not  part  of any  of 
the  tax  proposals,  however,  and  the  rhetoric  is rather  overwhelmingly  anti- 
consumption  in  general-  not just  anti-consumption  as  a short-term 
corrective. 
This  leads  to  the  key  unasked  question  of this  debate:  How  much  saving 
is  enough?  Since  the  supposed  link  is from  saving  to investment  to growth, 
the  real  question  is:  How  much  growth  is enough?  Since  it is not  possible  to 
design  a tax  code  which  is neutral,  we  cannot  simply  say  that  the  free  market 
will  produce  the  “right”  amount  of saving.  We  must,  therefore,  have  some 
idea  of what  a reasonable  ultimate  goal  should  be.  The  answer,  “More  than 
we  have  now,”  is  simply  inadequate. 
The  current  broad  consensus  on how  fast  the  economy  can  grow- 
independent  of cyclical  fluctuations-  is between  2.5%  and  3%  per  year. 
Changing  the  tax  system  is not  designed  to allow  the  economy  to  stay  closer 
to that  long-term  trend;  it is  explicitly  supposed  to raise  the  trend.  But  to 
what?  Without  an  undistorted  standard  of comparison,  it is impossible  to 
say.  Comparing  to our  past  (for  example,  the  high-growth  sixties)  is  hardly 
appropriate,  since  we  have  had  an income  tax  for nearly  our  entire  industrial 
history  (and  marginal  personal  tax  rates  on upper  incomes  in  the  that  decade 
were  historically  quite  high,  topping  out  at 91%).  Comparing  to other 
countries  is  tempting,  but  they  have  their  own  tax  systems  (generally  based 
on  the  income  tax)  with  their  own  incentives  and  disincentives-not  to 
mention  much  more  complete  versions  of the  welfare  state.  They  do  not 
presumptively  have  it right. 
page  30 When  it  comes  to  social  engineering,  of course,  it is  notable  that  the  one 
deduction  that  is  allowed  in many  of the  proposed  tax  systems  is  the 
dependent-child  exemption.  Rep.  Armey,  indeed,  specifically  refers  to the 
importance  of making  the  tax  system  more  fair  for  “families.”  If we  believe 
that  people  respond  to  financial  incentives,  might  we  not  conclude  that  this 
incentive  to have  children  is an  attempt  at  social  engineering?  After  all, 
many  state  welfare  systems  have  been  changed  recently  to  prevent  a 
minuscule  financial  incentive  from  inducing  a population  explosion  among 
the  poor.  Why  should  that  not  be  a similar  concern  in  the  general  tax  code? 
Is there  still  a way  to design  a tax  code  which  does  not  change  any 
relative  trade-offs  in  the  prices  of any  set  of goods?  This  is  the  claim  of the 
Flat  Tax,  which  claims  to tax  everything  once  and  only  once  at  exactly  the 
same  rate.  This  is  quite  distinct  from  the  explicit  consumption  taxes  (and  the 
USA  tax),  since  the  claim  is that  all goods,  services,  and  activities  would  be 
taxed  at  a uniform  rate-erasing  the  existing  bias  against  consumption 
rather  than  creating  a new  bias  in  favor  of saving.  (The  details  of the  Flat 
Tax  proposals  do leave  several  items  untaxed;  but  for  the  sake  of argument, 
one  can  take  the  assertion  at face  value.) 
For  example,  if-in  an imaginary  non-tax  world-a  Ford  Taurus  would 
cost  $20,000,  a weekend  vacation  $1,000,  and  course  at  a private  Junior 
College  $2,000,  then  one  can  take  twenty  vacations  for  the  same  price  as  one 
Taurus  and  two  vacations  for  the  same  price  as  one  course.  Any  single-rate 
tax  that  applies  equally  to  all  three  goods  would  preserve  those  trade-offs. 
For  example,  a  10%  tax  would  make  the  three  goods  cost  $22,000,  $1,100,  and 
$2,200,  respectively.  The  2O:l  and  1:2 (and,  of course  the  1O:l)  price  ratios 
would  remain. 
However,  maintaining  the  same  relative  price  structure  does  not,  except 
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has  an  annual  budget  of $30,000,  and  they  have  responded  to the  non-tax 
price  structure  by  buying  one  Taurus,  four  vacations,  and  three  courses. 
(There  is,  of  course,  no  reason  why  the  ratio  among  goods  purchased  must 
reflect  the  ratios  of their  prices.)  Even  assuming  that  it makes  sense  to talk 
about  fractions  of these  goods,  can  we be  sure  that  the  same  person  would 
buy  the  same  proportion  of goods  after  the  tax  is imposed-i.e.,  0.91  of a 
Taurus,  3.64  vacations,  and  2.73  college  courses? 
The  general  answer  is no,  because  of “income  effects,”  i.e.,  the  fact  that 
people  feel  poorer  due  to  the  decreased  buying  power  of their  budgets,  which 
can  make  them  alter  their  proportional  choices.  For  example,  the  person  in 
the  examples  above  might  respond  to the  new  situation  by  deciding  that  they 
really  need  to get  their  advanced  degree  sooner,  so that  they  can  raise  their 
income  in  the  future.  They  might  now  buy  five  college  courses,  cutting  back 
on both  fractional  Tauruses  and  vacations.  Another  person  might  just  give 
up  on  earning  more  (a supply-side  effect,  as  their  labor  choices  decrease  with 
higher  taxes),  in  which  case  they  might  buy  no  courses  and  take  a series  of 
weekend  vacations. 
The  technical  term  for  this  is that  people  do  not  have  “homothetic 
preferences,”  or that  they  do not  have  a “linear  income  expansion  path.” 
Whatever  the  terminology,  however,  it is clear  that  a tax  system  such  as  that 
in  the  United  States,  where  the  federal  government  collects  over  20%  of 
personal  income  in  total  taxes  (including  Social  Security  contributions),  must 
affect  people’s  choices.  Cutting  it to  lo%,  or 5%,  would  not  change  the  basic 
fact:  Taxes  are  never  neutral. 
This  is  true  even  if,  as  mentioned  earlier,  one  could  design  a tax  system 
which  taxed  everything  equally.  It is worth  discussing  in  some  detail  just 
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(which  would  certainly  imply  taxing  all  capital  goods-housing  as  well  as 
plant  and  equipment  investment  and  even  inventories-at  the  same  rate  as 
consumer  goods)  is  dimcult  enough,  given  the  existence  of non-traded 
non-priced  goods  and  the  difficulty  of even  measuring  the  “goods  and 
services”  provided  by  the  financial  sector. 
and 
More  intractable,  however,  is the  built-in  problem  that  taxes  on goods 
and  services  favor  leisure  over  labor.  That  is,  if a person  sees  a  10%  tax  on 
all goods  and  services,  this  means  that  they  lose  less  by  not  working  than 
before.  In the  example  above,  making  $30,000  does 
to;  so choosing  not  to work  is “cheaper”  than  it  used 
leisure,  then,  becomes  a major  problem  if one  really 
biases  in  the  tax  code. 
not  buy  all  that  it used 
to be.7  How  to tax 
wants  to  eliminate  all 
It is possible,  of course,  to accept  the  “unpleasant”  fact  that  taxation 
moves  people’s  behavior  away  from  the  Invisible  Hand’s  optima  but  still 
believe  that  these  distortions  should  not  consciously  be  considered  when 
designing  tax  policy.  When  a tax  happens  to  distort  behavior  in  one  direction 
or another  is one  thing;  but  when  Congress  deliberately  decides  to favor  one 
activity  over  another,  that  is “social  engineering.”  This  “see  no  evil” 
approach,  which  says  that  distortions  are  fine  so long  as  we  do  not  know  what 
they  are,  is bizarre  at best.  If the  economy  is  not  going  to be  where  the  non- 
taxed  free  market  would  have  it anyway,  why  not  use  our  analytical  powers 
7  It is not  guaranteed,  of course,  that  all  people  would  respond  to that  change 
in  relative  prices  by  working  less;  many  might  work  more  hours.  In the  aggregate,  it appears 
that  the  change  in  labor  hours  worked  in response  to changes  in  net  taxes  is zero,  i.e.,  those 
who  work  more  are  exactly  balanced  by  those  who  work  less. 
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matter  of moving  away  from  a state  of grace,  but  rather  of moving  from  one 
creation  of fallible  humans  to  another. 
Therefore,  rather  than  imagining  that  we  can  build  a non-distorting  tax 
system,  the  best  criteria  to  evaluate  a tax  system  are:  1)  What  goals  are  you 
trying  to promote?  and  2) Are  you  succeeding?  This  requires  a discussion  of 
what  the  tax  system  should  do,  beyond  just  raising  revenue.  Some  discussion 
of those  issues  can  be  found  below  and  in Buchanan  [1996]. 
N.  Making  Future  Change More Difficult 
One  of the  principle  goals  of economic  policy  is to  create  prosperity, 
preferably  in both  the  immediate  and  longer-term  senses.  Part  of the 
approach  to  achieving  that  goal  should  be  to maintain  maximum  flexibility  in 
policy-making,  i.e.,  to keep  all policy  options  open.  It is virtually  certain  that 
circumstances  will  change  over  time,  so forsaking  certain  policy  options 
ahead  of time  should  not  be  acceptable. 
k  Super-Majorities  and Referenda 
Flexibility  in  policy-making,  therefore,  should  be  preserved.  This 
means  that  the  enaction  of so-called  super-majority  requirements  in  changing 
the  tax  code  should  be  copiously  avoided.  The  Gephardt  Plan,  for  example, 
proposes  that  a national  referendum  be  held  before  any  tax  rate  could  be 
increased,  while  the  Kemp  Commission  proposed  super-majority 
requirements  in both  houses  of Congress  before  taxes  could  be  raised. 
In  response  to downturns  in the  economy,  it  should  be  easier  rather 
than  more  difficult  to lower  taxes,  since  the  key  to such  situations  is 
timeliness.  What  is less  obvious  is  that  this  need  for  flexibility  must  apply  in 
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extremely  concerned  about  a balanced  federal  budget,  it will  not  be 
acceptable  to  cut  taxes  in  a downturn  if it will  be  too  difficult  to increase  them 
again  when  the  economy  strengthens. 
Indeed,  the  various  proposals  are  silent  on  this,  but  it is  not  necessarily 
clear  that  one  could  even  pass  a law  with  a “sunset”  clause  in it (e.g.,  “taxes 
will  be  decreased  tomorrow  and  increased  back  to their  current  level  at  a 
specified  point  in  the  future”)  by less  than  a super-majority,  since  there  might 
be  a legal  challenge  to the  ability  to “raise  taxes”  in the  future,  even  if taxes 
are  only  to be  raised  back  up  to a previous  level. 
Moreover,  this  logic  does  not  apply  solely  to cyclical  changes  in  the 
economy.  If the  economy  were  to  start  growing  faster  in  a sustained  way 
(even  assuming  that  we  could  distinguish  that  from  a cyclical  upturn),  the 
logic  would  normally  be  to believe  that  the  higher-than-expected  tax  revenues 
should  either  be  spent  on previously-ignored  projects  or reduced  by  cutting 
taxes.  Should  there  be  a super-majority  requirement,  however,  any  deficit- 
hating  member  of Congress  would  not  want  to cut  taxes,  because  the  seeming 
improvement  in  the  economy  could  prove  to be  short-lived. 
The  only  remaining  response  would  be  either  to allow  excess  tax 
revenues  to be  a drag  on  the  economy,  or to spend  the  excess  on  whatever 
projects  might  be  handy  (since  spending  would  not  be  required  to  fall  under  a 
super-majority  rulrat  least,  not  yet).  Ironically,  therefore,  the  result  of a 
super-majority  rule  would  be  to decrease  the  likelihood  of tax  cuts  in both 
good  times  and  bad,  and  to increase  the  level  of government  spending. 
The  final  problem  with  the  super-majority  proposals  revolves  around 
the  definition  of what  type  of tax  law  change  is  covered  by  the  super-majority 
requirement.  The  proposal  by  the  Kemp  Commission  was  to require  a two- 
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to raise  the  single  tax  rate  itself. 
This  should  hardly  be  comforting  to anyone  concerned  about  rampant 
taxation,  however,  since  the  whole  method  of creating  progressivity  in  a flat 
tax  is  the  standard  deduction,  which  can  be  lowered  to bring  more  people  at 
the  bottom  into  the  system  without  raising  the  rate.  In fact,  the  higher  is 
one’s  income,  the  less  one  is hurt  by  this  maneuver,  and  thus  the  more 
beneficial  is the  brake  on  rate  increases.  The  entire  method  is biased  toward 
future  regressivity.  Compared  to the  current  system,  moreover,  in  which  over 
96%  of all  taxpayers  pay  less  than  17% of their  gross  income  in  total  federal 
income  taxes,  this  change  is hardly  a guarantee  of a tax  cut. 
This  has  encouraged  efforts  to create  “loophole-free”  tax  limitation 
plans.  One  constitutional  amendment,  proposed  by  Sen.  Kyl  and  defeated  in 
early  1996  (followed  by  promises  to re-file  the  bill),  would  put  a super- 
majority  requirement  on “any  law  that  will  have  as its  effect  to increase 
federal  tax  revenue.”  As  proposed,  such  an  amendment  would  not  even  allow 
balancing  provisions  (two  or more  proposals  which,  on net,  leave  tax  revenue 
unchanged)  to be  passed  by  a simple  majority.  This  means  that  any  tax 
proposal  that  would  raise  revenue,  whether  it be  a direct  rate  increase  or an 
obscure  definitional  change  that  would  broaden  the  tax  base,  could  only  be 
passed  by  a super-majority  vote. 
Beyond  the  nightmarish  details  involved  with  such  a broad  proposal, 
and  setting  aside  the  tendency  that  this  will  have  to prevent  change  in  either 
direction  (as  noted  above),  there  is a much  broader  problem  with  such  a plan. 
Dynamic  scoring,  as  discussed  earlier,  is based  on the  fact  that  the  flow  of tax 
receipts  depends  not just  on the  details  of the  tax  legislation  but  also  on  the 
decisions  that  people  make  following  the  tax  change.  If an  increase  in  the 
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implies  lower  tax  revenues  than  one  would  have  guessed  using  a static 
analysis. 
The  reason  that  dynamic  scoring  is so controversial,  however,  is that  it 
brings  into  question  not just  the  size  of the  changes  in  tax  revenue  but  the 
actual  direction  of the  change.  The  famous  “Laffer  Curve”  was  designed  to 
demonstrate  that  the  government  could  receive  more  tax  revenue  by  lowering 
the  tax  rate.  Whether  or not  one  believes  that  particular  assertion,  the 
concept  comes  up  again  and  again,  from  debates  about  capital  gains  taxation 
at  the  national  level  to arguments  over  property  tax  rates  at  the  local  level. 
It is very  often  the  case  that  one  can  find  forecasts  from  different  analysts  of 
both  increases  and  decreases  in  tax  revenue  due  to any  proposed  change  in 
tax  law. 
If a cut  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  will,  as  many  proponents  claim, 
increase  tax  revenue,  then  that  proposal  would  require  a super-majority  vote. 
The  obvious  response  to  this  would  be  for  proponents  of various  changes  in 
the  tax  code  to present  evidence  that  these  changes  will  be  revenue-losers, 
which  would  allow  them  to be  passed  by  simple  majorities.  The  current 
debates  would  be  turned  upside  down,  with  proponents  of higher  tax  rates 
adopting  Laffer  Curve-style  analyses  to ease  passage  of these  proposals. 
B.  Interactions  with Budget Rules 
If a super-majority  requirement  were  enforced  in  conjunction  with  a 
constitutional  amendment  requiring  a balanced  budget,  the  situation 
becomes  murkier  still.  If the  Balanced-Budget  Amendment  requires  a super- 
majority  vote  to  set  aside  the  requirement  of a balanced  budget  (as  recent 
versions  of the  amendment,  which  have  very  nearly  passed  in  the  Senate, 
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will  require  a super-majority  vote.  The  super-majority  requirements  in  the 
tax  bills  would  require  the  same  thing  for an  increase  in  revenue. 
The  result  of this  must  certainly  be  increased  paralysis  of the  political 
system.  Anyone  who  wants  to change  anything  to  do  with  fiscal  policy  must 
do  so with  a super-majority  vote.  Anyone  opposed  to  any  change  need  only 
show  that  the  change  has  some  effect  on the  federal  fiscal  system.  For  those 
who  believe  that  a perfect  fiscal  system  (so  perfect  that  it  will  never  need  to 
be  changed)  can  be  put  in place  before  these  proposals  become  part  of the 
Constitution,  this  might  be  the  desired  result.  For  others,  however,  the 
prospects  are  disheartening  at best. 
It is  even  possible  that,  rather  than  experiencing  increased  paralysis, 
the  system  could  completely  break  down.  If the  result  of not  changing  the  tax 
laws  is  to increase  revenues,  that  too  could  be  challenged  as a “tax  increase” 
that  needs  to  be  subjected  to a super-majority  vote.  Thus,  given  the  lack  of 
ability  to forecast  revenues  with  any  precision,  there  would  be  no  “default” 
position.  Any  chosen  alternative,  including  the  choice  not  to change  at all, 
would  be  open  to the  attack  that  it either  increases  tax  revenue  or increases 
the  deficit. 
The  only  technical  alternative  to this  would  be  to  designate  a particular 
agency  that  would  make  definitive  forecasts  for  every  policy  initiative 
forecasts  which  would  have  to be legally  immune  from  challenge.  This  would 
move  the  decision-making  power  further  away  from  elected  representatives, 
and  the  agency  would  be  forced  to institutionalize  a single  model  of the 
economy.  This  would  certainly  be controversial  among  both  economists  and 
politicians,  no  matter  which  approach  was  chosen,  since  the  economics 
profession  is  extremely  split  in its  opinions  about  various  approaches  to 
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arbiter  of economic  policy?  The  possibilities  for  dispute  and  conflict  are 
seemingly  endless. 
The  overall  conclusions  regarding  super-majority  requirements  are:  1)  If 
they  apply  only  to  changing  the  tax  rate  in  a single-rate  system,  the  result  is 
inherently  regressive,  2)  If they  apply  only  to  changing  the  tax  rates  in  a 
graduated-rate  system,  they  are  easily  side-stepped  by  changing  the  base,  3) 
If they  apply  to  the  base  as  well  as  the  rate(s),  it is  extremely  difficult  to 
define  what  a “tax  increase”  is,  leading  to more  gamesmanship,  and  4)  In 
conjunction  with  a balanced-budget  amendment  (or  a binding  balanced- 
budget  requirement),  the  super-majority  requirement  for  tax  increases  is 
likely  to lead  to legislative  stasis. 
V.  Important  Administrative  Questions 
k  Transitional  Issues 
One  of the  issues  that  will  prove  most  vexing  if the  current  tax  debate 
moves  from  the  theory  phase  to the  implementation  phase  will  be  the 
problem  of changing  from  the  old  tax  system  to the  new  one.  A few  serious 
considerations  should  be  noted  here,  as an indication  of the  depth  of the 
issues  involved. 
Prior  knowledge  of the  “rules  of the  game”  in  any  situation  has  an 
enormous  impact  on  an  individual’s  financial  plans.  A  crucial  part  of that 
prior  knowledge  is  the  relevant  tax  treatment  of alternative  strategies.  The 
more  abrupt  the  change  in the  tax  system,  therefore,  the  more  likely  it is that 
people  will  be  arbitrarily  helped  or harmed  by  a tax  law  change. 
One  area  where  this  is most  relevant  to middle-income  taxpayers  is in 
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secured  by  a thirty-year  financial  obligation,  on the  basis  of the  current  tax 
code.  While  any  change  in  the  tax  code  is going  to have  some  impact  on 
people’s  assets,  removing  the  most  popular  deduction  (or  making  any  other 
change  that  affects  the  tax  value  of the  deduction)  has  potentially  disastrous 
effects  on people’s  financial  situations.  The  National  Association  of Realtors, 
for  example,  estimates  that  the  elimination  of the  mortgage  interest 
deduction  would  reduce  the  value  of real  estate  in the  U.S.  by  over  $1  trillion, 
or almost  one-fifth  of its  current  total  value.  DRIMcGraw-Hill  puts  the  loss 
at  15%  of the  aggregate  value  of residential  real  estate. 
Not  only  does  this  mean  that  the  average  homeowner’s  primary  asset 
would  lose  one-fifth  of its  value,  it means  that  any  homeowner  whose  equity 
in  the  house  was  less  than  twenty  percent  would  see  their  entire  accumulated 
equity  disappear.  For  example,  a person  whose  home  is  worth  $150,000 
before  the  change  who  owes  $130,000  on the  mortgage  loan  would  see  their 
house’s  value  drop  to  $120,000,  such  that  their  equity  would  become  negative 
and  their  $20,000  nest  egg  disappears. 
Another  transitional  problem  has  to do with  generational  fairness. 
Moving  from  an  income  tax  system  to  a consumption  tax  system  has  a very 
perverse  effect  on  people  who  have  retired  or are  near  retirement,  in  that  it 
involves  taking  people  who  have  spent  their  entire  working  lives  paying 
income  tax,  and  then  changing  over  to a consumption  tax-just  when  they 
will  become  heavy  consumers.  This  problem  would  eventually  go  away,  but 
not  for  at least  thirty  years. 
As  Gravelle  Cl9941 explains,  the  problem  of transition  is  so profound 
that  it means  that  it is better  to stay  with  the  system  that  is  currently  being 
used.  If we  had  always  had  a consumption  tax  system,  then  switching  to an 
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income  tax  system,  though,  we  are  better  off improving  it rather  than  going 
through  the  pain  and  unfairness  of a transition. 
B.  Complexity  and  Simplicity 
The  public  debate  about  changing  the  tax  system  is,  as  noted  earlier, 
typically  not  being  waged  over  issues  like  economic  efficiency  and  super- 
majority  requirements.  More  often,  one  hears  speeches  about  the  complexity 
of the  current  tax  code  and  the  pervasive  influence  of lobbyists  on  the  system. 
While  these  and  other  issues  are  important  in  their  own  right,  they  are 
simply  arguments  for  “some  kind  of change”  rather  than  arguments  for  any 
specific  alternative. 
One  of the  effects  of this  atmosphere  has  been  the  emergence  of a 
“fetishism  of numbers.”  The  current  system  is  chastised  for  having  so many 
pages  of instructions  that,  “Placed  end  to end,  these  pages  would  stretch 
694,000  miles,  or  about  twenty-eight  times  around  the  earth.  The  IRS 
despoils  the  environment,  chopping  down  about  293,760  trees  to  print  all  of 
this  paper.”  [Hall  and  Rabushka,  1995’J8 
Estimates  of the  costs  of compliance  with  the  system  are  similarly 
without  serious  content,  with  the  often-heard  estimate  of $300  billion  reached 
through  calculations  (again  from  Hall  and  Rabushka)  that-despite 
protestations  to being  “conservative  estimates”-stretch  credulity.  The  fact  is 
that  the  system  is  complex,  but  calculations  like  this  create  the  false 
impression  that  the  country  will  be  $300  billion  richer  if the  current  system  is 
a  The  Nunn/Domenici  plan’s  length,  290  pages,  is also  considered  a public- 
relations liability. 
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One  response  to  the  understandable  desire  for  greater  simplicity  is  the 
promotion  of the  “post-card-sized  form”  for  filling  out  taxes.  Examples  of this 
form  typically  have  about  ten  lines.  However,  one  indication  of how  arbitrary 
this  type  of “simplicity”  is can  be  seen  in  the  following  line  (from  a card 
produced  in  conjunction  with  a proposal  by  Sen.  Arlen  Specter):  “Number  of 
dependents,  not  including  spouse,  multiplied  by  $4500.”  For  general  use, 
that  line  would  be  broken  into  at least  two  lines  (one  for  the  number  of 
dependents,  and  one  for  the  calculation)_not  because  tax  forms  have  to be 
complex,  but  to prevent  errors.  The  IRS,  in  fact,  already  has  the  equivalent 
of the  post-card-sized  form,  the  1040E2,  which  has  only  12 lines  (including 
lines  for  taxable  interest  income,  unemployment  compensation,  and  the 
Earned-Income  Credit,  none  of which  would  exist  under  most  of the  plans 
described  above)  and-with  much  larger  type-fits  on  the  front  of one  page  of 
typing  paper. 
Moreover,  even  if one  believes  that  fewer  and  shorter  forms  is the 
appropriate  goal  for  tax  policy,  this  is not  an  argument  for  any  of the 
substance  of the  various  tax  plans.  It does  not  argue  for  exempting  saving, 
since  that  is actually  more  complicated  than  simply  computing  and  taxing 
income.  It does  not  argue  for  eliminating  tax  brackets  (as  all  but  the 
Nunn/Domenici  and  Gephardt  plans  would  do),  since  those  calculations  can 
be  done  either  on  separate  pages  or (if one  wants  to save  trees)  by  the 
taxpayers  themselves  on  one  extra  line.  In short,  arguments  for  simplicity 
are  not  arguments  for  flatness  nor  for  abandoning  the  concept  of income 
taxation. 
Another  area  where  the  political  rhetoric  has  gone  beyond  of reality  is 
the  question  of the  role  of lobbyists.  The  idea  seems  to be  that  making  the 
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legislation.  Rep.  Gephardt’s  plan  comes  with  literature  that  goes  so far  as to 
say:  “The  10%  Tax  takes  away  the  lobbyist’s  seat  at  the  table.”  The  sad 
reality  is that,  even  if any  of these  plans  were  to be  adopted,  the  lobbying  to 
change  them  would  begin  immediately  after  they  were  enacted. 
It could  be  argued  that  the  highest-priced  lobbyists  would  have  nothing 
left  to lobby  for,  since  some  of these  tax  plans  give  their  clients  what  they 
have  wanted  for  years.  This  is not  what  the  rhetoric  is  meant  to imply, 
though,  as  Rep.  Gephardt’s  literature  also  says:  “Average  taxpayers  will  know 
that  everyone  else  is paying  their  fair  share:  high-priced  lawyers  and 
accountants  will  not  help  the  privileged  reduce  their  tax  bill.”  Reducing  the 
amount  of lobbying  for  the  privileged  by giving  the  privileged  what  they  want 
in  the  first  place  is hardly  a victory  for  the  average  American.  (This  criticism 
is least  true  of the  Gephardt  plan,  however.) 
The  presumption  in  the  debate  about  simplifying  taxes  seems  to be  that 
there  is a universally-desirable,  pure  system  of taxation  with  which  every 
reasonable  person  would  be  happy.  Presumably,  then,  that  perfect  system 
will  only  become  bad  if it gets  corrupted  by  “special  interests”  and  high-priced 
lawyers.  Neither  of these  presumptions  is  demonstrably  true,  given  that  the 
world  is  a complex  place,  and  the  tax  system  largely  reflects  that  complexity. 
That  said,  there  is definitely  virtue  in  the  idea  of simplifying  the  tax 
system.  The  Gephardt  plan  does  so, but  without  making  any  of the  other, 
more  radical,  changes  that  the  other  plans  would  make.  Even  so,  the  notion 
of “cleaning  out  the  stables”-or,  eliminating  the  accumulated  complexity  of 
the  tax  cod-should  be  mindful  of the  other  implication  of that  metaphor: 
the  stables  will  not  stay  clean.  The  1986  tax  reform  eliminated  many  of the 
most  abused  tax  shelters;  but  only  ten  years  later,  there  is  already  an 
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arguably  be  shoveled  out.  The  process  will  continue. 
Even  in  the  most  simplified  tax  system,  moreover,  the  most 
fundamental  attack  on  simplicity  (and  opening  for  political  lobbying)  will  be 
in  defining  what  is  taxable  and  what  is not.  A  system  that  is  designed  to  tax 
“consumption”  will  be  confronted  with  thousands  of purchases  that  can  be 
viewed  as  either  consumption  or investment  (e.g.,  a personal  computer).  How 
such  decisions  are  made  would  be  the  bread-and-butter  of congressional  tax- 
writing  committees  for  years  to come. 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  there  is  an important  scientific  benefit 
that  arises  from  the  complexity  of the  tax  code.  Economists  rely  heavily  on 
the  data  provided  by  tax  returns  and  tax  receipts  in  studying  the  economy. 
This  information  (which  includes  obscure  items  like  the  amount  deducted  for 
business  travel,  in  addition  to the  obvious  items  like  income  and  filing  status) 
would  otherwise  be  very  expensive  to collect,  which  implies  that  one  way  to 
characterize  at least  a fraction  of the  IRS  budget  is  for  economic  data 
collection,  similar  to  the  Census  Bureau  or the  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics. 
Moreover,  these  data  are  qualitatively  different  from  survey  data  in 
that  they  are  provided  by  virtually  everyone  in  the  economy  with  copious 
attention  to  accuracy.  (How  much  deliberately  inaccuracy  goes  into  these 
data  is an  interesting  question  as  well.)  This  benefit,  peripheral  though  it 
may  be,  should  not  be  overlooked.  If we lose  these  data,  we  will  either  have 
to spend  money  to collect  similar  data,  or we  will  not  be  able  to understand 
the  economy  as  well  in  the  future. 
VI.  Conclusions 
The  debate  over  changing  the  tax  system  has  brought  forth  both  useful 
page 44 proposals  and  irrelevant  side-issues.  This  analysis  has  attempted  to separate 
the  two,  and  to clarify  the  benefits  and  harms  of the  various  plans  for  radical 
tax  restructuring. 
Virtually  all  of the  plans  under  consideration  to replace  the  current  tax 
system  suffer  from  significant  shortcomings.  Their  revenue  effects  are 
speculative  at best,  most  would  abandon  income  taxation  entirely,  and  they 
are  based  on  a flawed  ideal  of a neutral  tax  code.  Moreover,  many  of the 
proposals  include  unworkable  and  unwise  limitations  on  future  fiscal  policy 
(some  in  the  form  of constitutional  amendments)  that  would  make  the  nation 
worse  off. 
The  transition  to any  new  system  would  create  significant  complexity, 
uncertainty,  and  intergenerational  fairness.  The  better  policy  would  be  to 
make  the  current  system  work  better.  Among  the  plans  proposed,  by  far  the 
most  judicious  and  sensible  is the  Gephardt  plan. 
No  matter  the  results  of this  round  of the  tax  debate,  however,  when  the 
day  is  done  we  can  be  sure  of one  thing:  someone  will  have  a new  proposal  the 
next  day.  It might  even  be  better  than  anything  we  have  now. 
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